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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Case No. 14497
BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by a contractor (Jaye Smith
Construction Company) to recover against the contracting
authority (Granite School District) for money that the
contractor claims is owed it under its contract with Granite
School District.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On December 19, 1975, the District Court, in a
Memorandum Decision (R. 61-62), held that plaintiff was
entitled to a judgment against defendant in the amount of
$4,992.24.

On January 7, 1976, the District Court, with

findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 63-65), entered
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judgment against defendant in the amount of $4,992.24 plus
interest in the amount of $715.54.

(R. 7 0 ) .

On February

20, 19 76, the District Court amended the judgment to reduce
the amount of interest awarded from $715.54 to $599.06
(R. 82-83).

.

x
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

•

Appellant seeks to have the District Court's
amended judgment reversed and to have judgment entered in
appellant's favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 6, 19 7 3, at the offices of Granite School
District, a bid opening session was conducted to determine
the low bidder on a contract to build an addition to the
Kearns Junior High School gymnasium (PX^/ 1 3 ) . The bids,
which were submitted in sealed envelopes, were opened by
Mr. Davidson, Director of New School Facilities, and handed
to Dr. Call.

(Tr.^y 54) .

In addition to its bid proposal

form (PX 1 0 ) , the envelope of Jaye Smith Construction Company
contained a letter signed by Mr. Jaye Smith stating:

V As hereinafter used, "PX" means "plaintiff's exhibit"
and "DX" means "defendant's exhibit."
^f As hereinafter used, "Tr." refers to the transcript
of testimony.
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Due to the difficulty in determining price
and availability of the three inch roof deck
material specified. . ., I have submitted my
proposal on the basis of a cost of 36 cents
per square foot of roof area. I use this
figure only as a basis for arriving at a
total bid price, and stipulate a change in
contract price, either higher or lower as the
information becomes available. (PX 11).
The evidence is clear that Granite School District officials
were not made aware of the contents of this "contingency"
letter during the bid opening session.

Mr. Davidson testi-

fied that the "contingency" letter was not noticed at that
time (Tr. 54); Dr. Call, in his affidavit, also claims that
the letter was not noticed (R. 48). Mr. Smith, the president
of plaintiff, also acknowledges that the contents of the
letter were not brought up during the session,* although he
claims a passing reference to the existence of the letter
was made (Tr. 8 ) . Plaintiff was second lowest bidder, and
became low bidder when the previous low bidder asked to be
and was allowed to withdraw its bid (Tr. 23-24, PX 13).
After the session, when Mr. Smith met with the facilities
representatives of Granite, no mention was made of the
bid's contingent nature (Tr. 25).

Immediately thereafter,

V In a letter dated January 14, 1974 (DX 9) from Jaye Smith
to Arthur Olsen, the architect assigned to the project, Smith
stated that he was "sorry the letter was overlooked at the
bid opening."
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Board of Education met and the following occurred:

v; ;

Dr. Call said that earlier this day, at
5:30 p.m., construction bids were opened
for the physical education additions at
Kearns Junior High School. The low responsible bidder was Jaye Smith Construction Company,.
with a bid of $164,022, and a completion date
of August 10, 19 73. . . . Dr. Call made a
recommendation that the Board award the bid
to Jaye Smith Construction Company. (PX 1 4 ) .

Again, there was no mention whatever of any contingency in
the bid made by plaintiff. (Id.).
Two days later on March 8, 1973, Mr. Smith, on
behalf of plaintiff, and Granite representatives met and
formally signed the contract (PX 1 2 ) , which provided in
paragraph 11:
The Board agrees to pay the contractor for the
said work and materials and for the full performance by the contractor of all covenants
and conditions in the manner and form set out
for the General Contract, including Plans &
Specifications the sum of One Hundred Sixty
Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,022) dollars
subject to additions and deductions as herein
provided, and subject to the provisions of
this Agreement,.
Nowhere in the contract is there any mention of a contingency
in the amount to be paid the contractor.

Moreover, by

plaintiff's own admission, no mention whatsoever of a contingent bid was made during the meeting in which Mr. Smith
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signed the contract.V

It was

not

u n til

approximately six

weeks later that Mr. Davidson discovered the existence of
the letter.

This occurred after Mr. Davidson heard about

the possible contingency and checked the bid envelope,
(Tr. 58).
At trial, counsel for Granite School District objected
strenuously to the admission of evidence extraneous to the
contract.

The evidence was admitted and the court granted

Granite a continuing objection to such evidence.

(Tr. 2,4).

jV The transcript contains the following interchange
between counsel for appellant and Mr. Smith:
Q.

On March 8, 1973 was there any discussion at that
time with Mr. Davidson as to the contingency in
your bid for the roof decking amount?

A.

No, there wasn't.

Q.

Did you in fact sign the contract on March 8th?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you sign it in the amount of
$164,022.00?

A.

I signed the contract with that amount written
out.

(Tr.25).

-5-
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Granite School District personnel have consistently refused
to sign any change order allowing plaintiff to receive funds
for the wood decking material beyond the amounts provided for
in the contract.

(Tr. 60). In April of 1974, several months

after the job was completed, Mr. Olsen, the architect assigned
to the project, signed a change order.

Granite School District,

the owner, did not sign the change order (PX 2 0) .
:

,

.

\
v

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONSIDERING "
EVIDENCE ANTECEDENT TO THE CONTRACT WHICH WAS ADMITTED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF VARYING OR CONTRADICTING THE WRITTEN CONTRACT.
A.

There is No Evidence Indicating that Granite Assented
to the Terms of the "Contingency" Letter.
Finding of Fact No. IV of the District Court states:
Court finds that the letter written by the
plaintiff was with the bid and it was present
at the bid opening. That the same was noticed
• by agents of the defendant, or should have
been, in the exercise of reasonable care in
the examination of the bids.
(R. 6 4) (Emphasis
added).

•

•

.

"

Finding No. V states:
Court finds that the qualification letter
was part of plaintiff's bid and became part
of the contract executed by parties. . .(Id.).
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j

By its terms, Finding IV is not a finding by the court that
Granite representatives were aware of the contents of "con- •
tingency" letter; on the contrary, the court's conclusion
that they should have noticed it clearly indicates an unwillingness by the court to conclude that Granite representatives in fact noticed the letter.

Furthermore, by concluding

in its memorandum opinion that "before the work was completed
they [Granite] did learn of the letter,"

the court again

indicates an unwillingness to conclude that Granite was
aware of the letter prior to signing the contract.
The error in the district court's findings is its
basing a contractual obligation on the fact that the letter
"should have been [noticed] in the exercise of reasonable
care."

Contractual obligations do not arise out of negligence;

rather, a contract can be found only where the parties thereto mutually assent .to its terms:
The principle is fundamental that a party cannot
be held to have contracted if there is no assent,
and this is so both as to express contracts and
contracts implied in fact. There must be mutual
assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential
elements or terms in order to form a binding
contract.
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §18, at 354 (1964).

Thus, the

court's absolute failure to find mutual assent to the terms
of contingency letter is fatal to the court's finding
that the letter "became a part of the contract."
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This is

especially so in light of the failure of Mr. Smith to bring
the contingency up in the meeting following the bid opening
and at the time the contract was signed.
B.

Even if Granite Representatives were Aware of the
Terms of the Contingency Letter any Evidence with
Respect Thereto is Barred by the Parol Evidence
Rule.
The parol evidence rule has been stated as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and
have expressed it in a writing to which both
have assented as the complete and accurate
integration of the contract, evidence,
whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent
understandings and negotiations will not be
admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.

3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §573, at 357 (1960).

The

parol evidence rule is clearly the law of the State of Utah.
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266
(1972); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769
(1969); Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 376, 323 P.2d
259 (1958); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah
2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957); Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co.,
143 P.2d 281 (Utah 1943).

The first essential under the parol

evidence rule is that the written contract be integrated.
This court, in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, supra explained
the requirements of an integrated contract:
An essential element of an integration is
that the parties shall have manifested
assent not meresly to the provisions of their
agreement but to the writing or writings in
question as a final statement of their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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intentions as to the matters contained
therein. Whether a document was or was
not adopted as an integration may be proved
by any relevant evidence.
501 P.2d at 270.

The relevant evidence in this case with re-

gard to this issue is as follows:

Granite representatives

were not aware of the contingent nature of the bid (the
uncontradicted evidence shows that, under its bid policies,
had Granite been aware of the contingency, the bid would have
been rejected (Tr. 55, 75-76)), and Mr. Smith never mentioned,
either after the bid session or when the contract was signed,
the contingent bid to Granite officials.

Thus, at the time

the contract was signed there was nothing to evidence any
intent by either party that the written contract was not the
full and complete agreement between them.

The best evidence

of the intent of the parties comes "from the four corners of
the instrument itself."

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.

Bybee, supra 306 P.2d at 775. As quoted above, paragraph 11
of the contract is clear and unequivocal as to the amount
to which the contractor was entitled; nowhere in paragraph
11 or elsewhere in the contract is any contingency mentioned
regarding the wood decking materials.

There is absolutely

no evidence in this case to indicate that the contract signed
by the parties was not a fully integrated contract.

Whether

Mr. Smith subjectively felt that the contingency should be .
part of the contract, he must be bound by his objective

-9-
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manifestation of assent to the terms of the written contract.
Once it is determined that a contract is integrated,
the following rule of law comes into effect:
[W]hen parties have reduced to writing what
appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in
the absence of fraud, that the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the
parties; and that parol evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations
or statements will not be received for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms
of the written agreement..
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, supra, 501 P.2d at 270
(emphasis added),.

Since the contingency letter was obviously

offered to vary the unambiguous terms of paragraph 11 of
the contract, the court clearly erred in allowing the admission of such evidence.

One of the best statements of

the policies behind the parol evidence rule is found in a
19 58 opinion of this Court, Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, supra.
In that case, defendant received delivery of a car from
plaintiff, paid plaintiff a $200 check, and signed a conditional
sales contract.
check.

Later, defendant stopped payment on the

The next day, however, defendant signed another

conditional sales contract containing "clear, complete terms,
including the price."

Defendant paid nothing on the car,

which was subsequently repossessed.

Responding to defendant's

contentions that the contract was cancelled, that he meant
to enter a different contract, and that he didn't execute
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,-10J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the contract, the Court stated:
[H]is testimony was diametrically opposed
to the manifestation of mutual assent reflected in his execution of an instrument
whose terms were clear, unambiguous,
understandable and known.
Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the
parties. But is is also elementary and of
extreme practical importance that we hold
contracting parties to their clear and
understandable language deliberately committed
to writing and endorsed by them as signatories
thereto. Were this not so business, one with
another among our citizens, would be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic purpose •
of the law to supply enforceable rules of
conduct for the maintenance and improvement
of an orderly society's welfare and progress
would find itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for
language which he himself espouses. Such
language is the only implement he gives us
to fashion a determination as to the intentions
of the parties. Under such circumstances we
should not be required to embosom any request
that we ignore that very language. This is
as it should be. The rule excluding matters
outside the four corners of a clear, understandable document, is a fair one, and
one's contentions concerning his intent
should extend no further than his own clear
expressions.
It was urged correctly that to admit
matters outside a contract would do violence to the principle that one is bound
by his manifestations of assent, and that,
irrespective of such contention, such
matters properly are excludable by the
parol evidence rule,—which rule, counsel
suggests, is one of substantive law rather
than one of evidence. Whatever kind one
calls it, the rule that excludes such
evidence is a common sense rule.
323 P.2d at 260-61 (Emphasis added).

Similarly in the instant
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case, the contract terms were "clearf unambiguous, understandable and known."

As such, this Court should again "hold

contracting parties to their clear understandable language
deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as
signatories thereto."

Appellant submits that prejudicial

error was committed by the District Court in admitting the
evidence as to the contingent nature of the bid and that the
judgment should therefore be reversed.
POINT II
THE CHANGE ORDER SIGNED BY ARTHUR OLSEN IN APRIL 1974*IS
NOT BINDING UPON GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
A.

The Change Order is Clearly Invalid Since the Owner
Has Never Approved "it.
One of plaintiff's claims at trial was that a change

order (PX 20) signed by the architect assigned to- the project
was binding upon Granite School District, thus requiring
Granite to pay plaintiff for the extra cost of the wood
decking.

The District Court did not rule on this issue,

either in its Memorandum Decision (R. 61-62) or its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 63-65).

Nevertheless,

appellant will address this issue on appeal since it is clear
as a matter of law that the change order is not binding on
Granite School District.

The change order presented in

evidence by plaintiff (PX 20) contains the following signatory sec'.'.'jn:
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Arthur K. Olsen
Architect

Jaye Smith Const., Inc.
Contractor

Ctoier

357 East 5th South
Address

3299 Msadowbrook Drive
Address

Address

Salt Lake City, Utah

Salt Lake City, Ut 84119

By / s / Arthur K. Olsen

By / s / Jaye B. Smith

By

Date: April 26, 1974

Date: April 25, 1974

Date:

The change o r d e r was n o t and has n e v e r been s i g n e d by t h e owner
of t h e p r o p e r t y .
incomplete.

Thus, on t h e face of t h e document

it.is

Moreover, t h e u n r e b u t t e d e v i d e n c e of Mr. Davidson

and Mr. H i l t o n , t h e p r e s e n t D i r e c t o r of F a c i l i t i e s / shows t h a t
t h e p r a c t i c e i n G r a n i t e School D i s t r i c t i s t h a t e v e r y change
o r d e r must be approved by t h e a s s i s t a n t s u p e r i n t e n d e n t and
s i g n e d by a G r a n i t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s w e l l a s t h e a r c h i t e c t
(Tr. 50, 7 6 ) .

More i m p o r t a n t l y , p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e s i d e n t h a s

a d m i t t e d t h a t both t h e a r c h i t e c t and owner a r e i n v o l v e d i n
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r e x t r a funds w i l l be a p p r o v e d :
Q.

A.

(Tr. 40)

And t h a t i s , of c o u r s e , i n May of 1973.
You d i d n ' t b e l i e v e i t was a change o r d e r
- expense? You b e l i e v e i t was a d d i t i o n a l
expense t o t h e c o n t r a c t , d i d n ' t you?
F r a n k l y t h e a r c h i t e c t and owner d e c i d e how
t h e s e d i f f e r e n t l i t t l e w r i n k l e s a r e t o be
handled.

(Emphasis a d d e d ) .

Absent t h e s i g n a t u r e of t h e

o w n e r ' s a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , t h e change o r d e r s h o u l d
be h e l d i n v a l i d .
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Both the Contractor and Architect Were Aware, At the
Time of the April 19 74 Change Order", That the Architect
Was Not Authorized to Bind Granite School District:•
As a legal matter, it is clear that the architect

was powerless to bind the appellant via the April 19 74 change
order.

The contract in this case outlines specific powers of

the architect over various matters yet clearly does not authorize
the architect to bind Granite as to change orders.

Such situatic

are governed by the rule that "specific authorization of particular acts tends to show that a more general agency is not
intended."

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 37(2) (1958).
Moreover, both the architect and contractor were

aware of this lack of power, as the exhibits clearly demonstrate
In DX 8, a letter from Olsen, the architect, to Davidson, dated
January 8, 19 74, Olsen clearly recognizes the need for approval
by someone other than himself:

!l

[T]he wood decking is an item

that will need to be resolved at a meeting with the appropriate
Granite School District representatives.°

This is further

demonstrated by PX 17, a letter from Davidson to Olsen dated
January 10, 1974, in which Davidson makes it very clear that
the decision whether to pay plaintiff was not one to be made
by Olsen.

Moreover, it is also clear that Smith was aware

that Olsen was not authorized to bind Granite by virtue of
fact that Smith had read Davidson's letter to Olsen.

In PX

18, a letter from Smith to Olsen, Smith refers to the contents
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of Davidson's letter.

Smith also stated in testimony that

he saw the January 10 letter and was aware that Granite was
not going to authorize the payment.

(Tr. 36-37).

Therefore,

because of its knowledge to the contrary, plaintiff cannot
claim that it believed that Olsen was authorized to issue
the April 1974 change order.
C.

The Change Order, Even if Validly Executed, is Unenforceable Since it is Not Supported by Consideration.
As discussed supra, the change order relied upon

by plaintiff was executed months subsequent to the completion
of the project.

Plaintiff had fully performed its obligations

with regard to the additions to the junior high gymnasium.
Under the law of contracts, a contract may be superseded or modified by another contract (such as a change order).
However, the law is clear that
a new agreement by the parties to an older one, altering, canceling, supplementing, or supplanting
their former compact, in order to be valid, requires
some consideration. Where a written contract is,
by a later contract, altered or modified in some
of its terms, the later contract must be founded
upon some valid consideration.
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 460, at 926-27 (1964).

What does

or does not constitute sufficient consideration is further
analyzed in the same treatise:
[I]t is generally held that there is insufficient
consideration in the absence of • . . reciprocity
of consideration. Each party must gain or lose something by the change. If the benefit or detriment
is unilateral, a consideration is lacking, for it

-15-
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is a well established legal principle that doing
or undertaking to do only that which one is already
under a legal obligation to do by his contract is
no consideration for another's agreement to do
what he is not already under a legal obligation to
<io.

Id. § 461, at 927-28 (emphasis added).

In this case, Granite

could receive nothing more than it had already received under
the contract.

Any benefit derived from the change order was

necessarily unilateral.

Thus, under the legal principles

articulated above, the change order was without consideration
and therefore unenforceable.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AFTER TRIAL HAD BEGUN.
At trial, after evidence had been presented, plaintiff sought to amend its complaint to include a claim that
defendant had improperly withheld payment from plaintiff for
extra costs incurred in striping
Kearns Junior High School.

the basketball floor at

This request was granted over

.

defendant's objection (Tr. 18-19) and the Court ultimately
granted judgment.for. plaintiff on this claim in the amount of
$150.

Granite was neither prepared to present evidence on or

to defend against plaintiff's allegations regarding this claim.
Defendant was prepared regarding the issues raised by plaintiff1
complaint—namely, whether Granite was liable for the added co^c

-16-
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of the decking material.

Plaintifffs complaint (R. 1-2),

which was filed on September 12, 19 74, made no claim whatever
on the striping question, nor was any discovery had on this
issue.

AS such, defendant was completely surprised and pre-

judicially affected by the Court's allowing plaintiff to amend
its complaint after trial had begun.
Although it is freely conceded that Rule 15(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend
pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires,"
such liberality cannot operate to the prejudice of another
party.

Indeed, one of the primary purposes of pleading is to

prevent surprise at trial.

In Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 F.R.D.

438 (M.D. Pa. 1947), for example, the court was construing the
purposes of pleading under the Federal Rules (after which the
Utah rules are patterned), and had this to say:
The whole theory with respect to the functions of
pleading is changed. Under the equity practice the
function was to plead facts and to frame the issues.
Under the new rules, the purpose of the pleadings
is to give notice of what an adverse party may expect to meet. The broadening of the discovery rules
and other pretrial procedure is designed to define
the issues and obtain the facts.".
Id. at 440 (Emphasis added).

Thus, unless an adverse party

is notified of the claims of the other party, the whole purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is subverted.
The case law in the United States is unanimous in
its conclusion that the liberal rule regarding amendment of
pleadings must be weighed against the possible prejudicial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effect such liberality can have on an opposing party.

In

Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1968),
just prior to trial (and four years after the initial answer
was filed) the defendant attempted to amend its answer to
raise a statute, of limitations defense.

In holding that the

defendant could not be allowed to amend at that late date,
the court reasoned:

(

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires that leave to amend
the pleadings be granted freely "when justice so
requires." At the same time, it is clear that such
leave should be denied where the amendment would
cause substantial prejudice to a party to the action.

Id. at 1155 (Emphasis added).

See also Jackson City Bank &

Trust Co. v. Blair, 333 Mich. 399, 53 N.W. 2d 493 (1952),
where the court held that "only those amendments should be
allowed which do not work to the surprise or disadvantage of
the adverse party."

Finally, in summarizing the law regarding

amendment of pleadings, a well known treatise stated:
The court will ordinarily refuse to grant its
permission to amend a pleading where the motion
comes too late and in such circumstances that the
rights of the adverse party will necessarily be J
prejudicially affected.
61 Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 314, at 720 (1972).

Because Granite

School District was not apprised in any manner prior to trial
that claims relating to the basketball striping would be litigated, it is clear that it was surprised at trial and thereby
prejudicially affected.

A fundamental tenet of our judicial

system is that a party be given time to prepare its case; this
-18-
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was not done with regard to the plaintiff's striping claim.
As such, this court should hold that the District Court erred
in allowing plaintiff to amend.
CONCLUSION
Bidding procedures by their very nature require that
the bidder make a firm statement of the amount for which he is
willing to do a particular project.

If contingent bids were

allowed, it would become difficult, if not impossible to determine who the real low bidder actually is.

In the instant case,

for example, if plaintiff were awarded the extra $4,842.25 it
claims, its actual bid.will be $168,864.25, or $1878.25 over
the bid of Dean Cannon Construction Company (PX 13).

This ob-

viously creates a very unfair situation to bidders in the position of Cannon Construction Company.

Furthermore, as Mr.

Davidson stated in this regard, "[ijf we allow things like
this to crop into our bidding then the question

of who was

the low bidder just becomes a circus because every contractor
has some problems when it comes to bidding a job." (PX17).
Granife School District respectfully urges this Court
to reverse the trial court's award of judgment to plaintiff
on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court committed prejudicial
error in admitting antecedent evidence which was offered
for the purpose of varying the terms of an integrated
contract between the parties.
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(2)

The change order signed by Mr. Olsen is.

matter of law, not binding on Granite School District.
as a
(3)

The trial court committed prejudicial error

in allowing plaintiff to amend its complaint after trial
had commenced.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

By M- &?>*** FTJJYA
M. Byr,6n Fisher

Ted D. Smxth
Attorneys for Appellant
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